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COMMENTS
HALLEY, HILLEY, AND HOUSE BILL 670-A STUDY IN
PARTITION AND SURVIVORSHIP IN
TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTYt
Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr. and Frank W. Weathers, Jr.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1960 and 1961 the Supreme Court of Texas rendered two
decisions in the community property area which promise to be
of landmark proportions. Both of these decisions seemed to resolve
troublesome areas in the Texas law of marital rights. The first,
Hailey v. Hailey, (by limiting the application of statutory language) resolved one of the problems arising in awards of community property upon divorce. The second, Hilley v. Hilley, (by
extending the restrictions of applicable statutes) affirmed traditional
concepts of the unity of the community during marriage as against
inter vivos agreements to change the status of marital property.
The Hilley decision in broad dictum3 indicated a method consonant
with constitutional and statutory definitions by which a joint
tenancy with survivorship in community property could be created.
The decision, however, acted as a catalytic agent upon the 57th
Legislature which promptly enacted House Bill 670.' The bill
amended Section 46 of the Probate Code' to permit husband and
wife by written agreement to create a joint tenancy with survivorship. The result was to produce a new area of doubt in the realm
which the Hilley decision had apparently quieted.
It might appear on the surface that these two decisions and the
subsequent legislation have little in common. However, partition
of the community is the common ground upon which they meet.
Hailey involved involuntary partition of community realty on
divorce. Hilley involved a voluntary prospective partition of the
community estate while the community was still in existence. It is
t A major portion of this Comment involves analysis of voluntary partition of community property in Texas. The same subject is dealt with in Wren, Recent Texas Statutes
Affecting Estate Planning, 15 Sw. L.J. 479 (1961). That Article presents the practical
approach, invaluable to the estate planner. This Comment presents a theoretical analysis of
the impact upon the general problem which results from the unique philosophy of Texas
marital law.
1 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 299 (1960).
161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
Id. at 579, 342 S.W.2d at 571.
4

5

Acts 1961, ch. 120.

Tex. Prob. Code § 46 (1955).
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the purpose of this Comment to explore briefly the historical, legal,
and social matrix from which each of these decisions arose and to
predict the effect of the recent legislation upon the latter decision.
II.

DIVISION UPON DIVORCE

Article 4638 states that
The court pronouncing a decree of divorce shall also decree and order
a division of the estate of the parties in such a way as the court shall
deem just and right, having due regard to the rights of each party and
their children, if any. Nothing herein shall be construed to compel
either party to divest himself or herself of the title to real estate.0
This provision has remained substantially unchanged since its original
enactment' by the Republic in 1841.
In 1871 the Supreme Court of Texas in Tiemann v. Tiemann
held that an award in fee to the wife of the community homestead
consisting of house and lot was ineffectual because it divested the
husband of title to realty. Hence, said the court, the wife was
entitled only to a life estate under such a decree. This decision was the
basic lodestone to which the courts were drawn while struggling
with the often conflicting poles of accomplishing "complete equity
as between the husband and wife and the children, having due regard
to all obligations of the spouses and to the probable future necessities
of all concerned."' In attempting to satisfy the opposing interests
of social policy and statutory command the supreme court subsequently construed the statute to permit the court to place separate
realty of the wife in the hands of a trustee and to order the trustee
to pay the income from the property to the husband, wife, and
children." The court also approved the imposition of a lien upon
all of the husband's property in order to secure one-half of the
community property to the wife.1"
Prior to the decision in Hailey v. Hailey,"2 Texas Courts of Civil
Appeals were in irreconcilable conflict in their interpretation of
the divestiture provisions of Article 4638. One group of cases took
a literal view of the statute's mandate. Divorce decrees awarding a
'Tex.

Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4638 (1925).

(Emphasis added.)

'Act of Jan. 6, 1841, 5 Laws of the Republic 19 (Hartley 1850).
034 Tex. 523 (1871).
Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923).
0
Fittsv. Fitts,
14 Tex. 443 (1855). The same treatment has been accorded community
property. Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58 (1858).
"Simons v. Simons, 23 Tex. 344 (1859); Smith v. Smith, 187 S.W.2d 116 (Tex Civ.
App. 1945).
12 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 299 (1960).
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tract of community realty exclusively to the wife, 3 awarding one
parcel of community realty to the wife and another to the husband, ' or awarding after-acquired equities in community property
exclusively to the wife1" were all struck down in the name of divestiture prohibition. A second group of cases turning on a more liberal
interpretation reasoned that the award of one parcel of community
realty to one spouse is merely a division of realty between the parties
having title and was not a divestiture of title within the meaning of
the statute."0 Such reasoning permitted both a decree awarding a
tract of community realty to the wife in satisfaction of her interest
in the estate" and another decision awarding three improved lots to
one spouse and two unimproved lots to the other. "
In Hailey v. Hailey the husband and wife owned two very similar
tracts of land as community property. The husband sued the wife
for divorce and for a division of the community property. The
trial court granted the divorce and awarded one of the two tracts
of community realty to the husband and the other to the wife. The
wife challenged the validity of this partition decree on the ground
that it divested the parties of title to realty in violation of Article
4638. The supreme court held that the portion of Article 4638
which prohibits divestiture of title to real estate has no application
to community realty. The court reasoned that partition is not
a "divestiture" but a judicial proceeding through which two or
more co-owners may cause jointly held property to be divided into
as many shares as there are owners." This partition vests each coowner with separate ownership of the particular tract alloted to
him. ° The deeds of partition are then said to dissolve a tenancy in
common and do not operate as a "conveyance or transfer of title.""
It is easily recognized that such an argument is largely a matter
of semantics. However, the justification for the result is readily
found in common experience. Absent a partition at the time of
divorce, the parties hold their estate as ordinary tenants in common." It appears rather naive to expect parties in the strained rela"Lewis v. Lewis, 179 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
4
Swanson v. Swanson, 229 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
"Maisel v. Maisel, 312 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
'6Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Puckett v. Puckett, 205
S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
"7Young v. Young, 23 S.W. 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
"SMansfield v. Mansfield, 308 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error dism. w.o.j.
"gHudgins v. Sansom, 72 Tex. 229, 10 S.W. 104 (1888).
2"Houston Oil Co. v. Kirkindall, 136 Tex. 103, 145 S.W.2d 1074 (1941); Chace v.
Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 32 S.W. 520 (1895); Davis v. Agnew, 67 Tex. 206, 2 S.W. 43 (1886).
"Houston Oil Co. v. Kirkindall, 136 Tex. at 109, 145 S.W.2d at 1077.
2The rules of law governing co-tenancy generally control unpartitioned property.
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tionship which produced divorce to hold property in common with
any degree of amicability. It seems that the present construction
of Article 4638, which restricts its operation concerning divestiture
of title to realty to the separate property of the spouses, is one to
be received with approbation. The judicial partition at time of
divorce ensures an equitable division at the only time all of the
facts surrounding the dissolved marital community are before the
court. Undoubtedly the parties subsequent to the divorce proceeding could, as tenants in common, apply to the court for a judicial
partition," or could partition by agreement. Thus, the effect of the
principal case is to prevent vexatious and expensive subsequent
litigation in the first instance and to prevent the more solvent party
from taking undue advantage in the second.
It may be argued that the principal case should be confined to
its facts, allowing partition only of virtually identical community
tracts. However, the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals, following the
principal case, has upheld an award of the community homestead
consisting of one acre of land and a house to the wife in fee while
apparently awarding nothing to the husband." It does not appear
difficult to predict that under the decision in Halley v. Halley, any
award of community property made in the trial court to either
or both of the parties will be upheld as long as it can be found to
do equity to the parties upon a proper finding of their needs and
circumstances.
III.

DIVISION DURING MARRIAGE

The landmark case of King v. Bruce"3 held that a husband and
wife could not by agreement partition their community property
so as to make each half the separate property of the individual
spouses. As a result of this decision, Article 16, Section 15, of the
Texas Constitution was amended in 1948 to provide authority for
Harkness v. McQueen, 207 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Freeman v. Pierce, 250
S.W. 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
23Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6082 (1925); Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. rules 756-71
(1940).
4
" Hellums v. Hellums, 335 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). This is contrary to
Tiemann v. Tiemann, 34 Tex. 523 (1871), which the court inferentially overruled in
Hailey v. Hailey, 331 S.W.2d at 303, saying, "It follows that we disagree with the
holdings in Lewis v. Lewis and those cases following that rule." Lewis v. Lewis, 179 S.W.2d
594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), was a case which had followed the Tiemann doctrine. See
also McElreath v. McElreath, - Tex. -,
345 S.W.2d 722, 724 (1961) (dictum).
25 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769 (1947). See also King
v. Matney, 259 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.; Bruce v. Permian
Royalty, 186 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. w.o.m.; McDonald v. Stevenson,
245 S.W. 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error ref.
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partition by agreement, and Article 4624a" was enacted to provide
the procedural requirements for the sanctioned partition. The Texas
courts have insisted that the statutory provisions be followed, or
the partition will be void." The constitutional amendment and the
resultant legislation, therefore, did not operate to change the general
rule in Texas that the spouses cannot change the community
character of property by mere agreement.28
It should be noted in addition to the two methods of partition
previously mentioned, i.e., by divorce decree and under Article
4624a, that community property may also be partitioned in connection with an agreement for permanent separation." Further,
Article 881a-23 was amended in 19570 so as to provide that shares
or share accounts of savings and loan associations may be partitioned
by formal written agreement." Moreover, in addition to partition,
community property may be converted into separate property of the
spouses by a gift"2 from one spouse to the other. There is no
question that the husband may give part or all of his share of the
community to his wife, thereby converting the gift into her separate
property." It also seems that the wife can make a similar gift
although there are only dicta 4 and the statements of two leading
authorities2 to support her power to do so. However, if the transfer
of community property between the spouses is supported by consideration, it will fail as a gift and be held an invalid partition. For
5
example, in the case of Pevehouse v. Lubbock Nat'l Bank,"
a husband
26 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4624a

(1949).

"7Williams v. Williams, 319 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error dism.; Reed v.
Reed, 283 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
28 Huie, Some Basic Principles of Texas Community Property Law, 15 La. L. Rev. 605,
620 (1954), in Comparative Studies in Community Property Law 114, 130 (Charmatz &
Daggett ed. 1955), citing Cox v. Miller, 54 Tex. 16 (1880); Browkaw v. Collett, 1 S.W.2d
1090 (Tex. Coin. App. 1928). See also Proetzel v. Schroeder, 83 Tex 684, 19 S.W. 292
(1892).
'2Speckels v. Kneip, 170 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. There must be
an actual separation agreement to make a valid partition. Cf. Carter v. Barnes, 25 S.W.2d
606 (Tex. Corn. App. 1930) adopted.
"°Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 881a-23 (1929), as amended, Acts 1957, ch. 445,
§ 1, at 1319.
as The statute now provides that a written agreement be executed by husband and
wife to accomplish such a partition and that they "acknowledge the same in the manner
now required by law for the conveyance of realty."
"Southern Pac. Ry. v. Ulmer, 286 S.W. 193 (Tex. Corn. App. 1926); see Comment,
4 Sw. L.J. 218 (1950).
"Sorenson v. City Nat'l Bank, 121 Tex. 478, 49 S.W.2d 718 (1932).
'King
v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769 (1947);
Collett v. Houston & T.C.R.R., 186 S.W. 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error ref.; cf.
Stratton v. Robinson, 67 S.W. 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) error ref., where a gift by
the wife to the husband of community realty using the device of conveying it to a trustee
for reconveyance to the husband was upheld.
asHuie, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas § 9 (1960); Speer,
Marital Rights in Texas § 132 (3d ed. 1929).
3679 S.W.2d 1107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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conveyed to his wife a portion of the community property on condition that the wife relinquish her rights in the remainder of the
property; the court held that the agreement was not a gift. Finally,
of course, community property can be converted into separate
property by will."
Closely allied to the problem of partitioning or otherwise converting community property into separate estates by gift or devise
is the problem of inter vivos survivorship agreements between husband and wife which have the effect of converting community
property into separate property after the death of one of the
spouses. In the past these agreements have had to be considered in
the light of Article 4610"3 which is substantively unchanged from
Section 5 of the 1840 Act." It provides that no contract of marriage
shall alter the legal order of descent. This prohibition with respect
to antenuptial contracts was early (though quite artificially) extended to include agreements made after marriage as well." Moreover, Section 46 of the Probate Code4 (formerly Article 2580)
incorporates the provisions of an Act of 1848 which abolished
common-law joint tenancy with survivorship"' Fairly recently, however, this article was interpreted to abolish joint tenancy only where
it would have been created by law and was construed so as not to
prevent creation of joint tenancy by contract, will, or conveyance.
This interpretation was incorporated in Section 46 of the Probate
Code which with new language virtually nullifies the 1848 statute.
At the time Hilley v. Hilley 5 was before the supreme court, there
were four previously decided Texas cases which were specifically
directed to the problem of survivorship agreements and community
37

Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957).
"STex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4610 (1925).
39Act of Jan. 20, 1840, § 5, 4 Laws of the Republic of Texas 3, 5, 2 Gammel's
Laws of Texas 177, 179 (1898); see Huie, op. cit. supra note 28, at 115.
4 Cox v. Miller, 54 Tex. 16 (1880). This judicial extension of the legislative
prohibition has been consistently followed down to the present time. See Weidner v. Crowther,
157 4 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957).
' Tex. Prob. Code 5 46 (1955).
4 Act of Mar. 18, 1848, § 12, 3 Laws of Texas 132 (Gammel
1898).
43 Chandler v. Kountze, 130 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error
ref. See also
Johnson v. Johnson, 306 S.W.2d 780 (Tex Civ. App. 1957) error ref.; Adams v. Jones,
258 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Shroff v. Deaton, 220 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949). As to the applicability of survivorship to trusteeship see Red River S. & W. Ry. v.
Blount, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 282, 22 S.W. 930 (1893).
" Tex. Prob. Code § 46 (1955) incorporated the language of former Art. 2580 and
then added, "Provided, however, that by an agreement in writing of joint owners of
property, the interest of any joint owner who dies may be made to survive to the surviving
joint owner or joint owners, but no such agreement shall be inferred from the mere fact
that the property is held in joint ownership." Acts 1955, ch. 5, at 88.
"' 161 Tex, 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
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property. The first was Shroff v. Deaton." In that case the court
ruled that a survivorship agreement between spouses concerning a
joint bank account was valid. However, the decision rested on a
finding of fact that the decedent husband had made a valid gift
to his surviving wife a short time before his death. Nonetheless, the
court bolstered its holding with the dictum that survivorship could
be created by agreement where there was no fraud or mistake. The
only case cited in the opinion in support of this dictum was
Chandler v. Kountze,"8 a joint ownership case which did not involve
community property.
A few years later, another court of civil appeals was faced with
the same fact situation in regard to postal savings certificates. In
this case, Reed v. Reed," the survivorship agreement was held invalid
because it attempted to work a mutation of community into separate
property. Subsequent to the Reed decision, the Texas Supreme Court
decided the controversial Smith v. Ricks5" which involved United
States savings bonds purchased with community funds. The bonds
named the spouses co-owners and gave sole ownership to the survivor.
The majority, affirming the agreement, rested the decision on the
controlling effect of the United States Treasury regulations. The
court also found a third party beneficiary contract between the
government and the husband for the benefit of the surviving wife.
However, the question of whether similar survivorship agreements
might be valid in the absence of a federal supremacy situation was
not discussed.
Shortly thereafter Pollard v. Steffens5 came before a court of
civil appeals. There the appellee, an attorney, had obtained a favorable judgment on a bill of review to set aside judgment on distribution of his father's estate. He relied on mistake of law, indicating that he had agreed to the original probate judgment only because he had thought that Chandler and Shroff were controlling,
and that the Reed decision had indicated his mistake. Nonetheless,
4 Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 184 S.W.2d 823 (1945), is omitted from this discussion despite the fact that it is frequently cited in this area. The case turned on the
power of distribution vested in a life tenant and is thus distinguishable from the narrow
point involved here.
4'220 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
48 130 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref.
"'283 S.W;2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
5'159 Tex. 280, 318 S.W.2d 439 (1958), noted, 13 Sw. L.J. 369 (1959). The case is
erroneously reported as Ricks v. Smith in the Southwestern Reporter.
5, 319 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), aff'd, Tex -, 343 S.W.2d 234 (1961).
The supreme court decided the Pollard case one week after the Hilley decision and
affirmed on grounds entirely different from the basis of decision in the court of civil
appeals.
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the appellate court ruled that Smith v. Ricks was decisive and
reversed and rendered against him."

A. Hilley v. Hilley
It was in this setting that Hilley v. Hilley came before the court.
There the husband and wife had purchased corporate stock which
was issued to them jointly with provision for right of survivorship."s
Upon the husband's death, his son by a previous marriage brought
suit to secure his interest in the property under the law of descent
and distribution. The son claimed that the property acquired with
community funds could not be stripped of its community character
by an inter vivos transfer providing for joint tenancy and survivorship between the spouses. The court of civil appeals held for the
heir against the surviving spouse,54 and the supreme court affirmed
on the ground that the survivorship agreement created by purchase
of stock certificates in joint tenancy with community funds is
invalid as a partition of the marital community without conformity
to statute; or in the alternative it contravened Article 4610 by
altering the legal order of descent by inter vivos agreement.
In reaching its decision the court indicated that Chandler v.
Kountze and Adams v. Jones5 were inapplicable because they did
not deal with community property. Shroff v. Deaton was discounted
because of the finding of gift in that case. It was reasoned that since
the stock was held by both parties without relinquishment of control, a finding of gift could not stand. Most significantly, the court
proceeded to assail the reasoning of Smith v. Ricks and Edds v.
Mitchell." It was pointed out that the third party beneficiary analysis
of the Ricks case was merely a "mask" for a pure survivorship
" The attorney plaintiff was probably justifiably misled as to the law. He entered
into the agreed judgment in the probate court in 1953 relying on Chandler v. Kountze and
Shroff v. Deaton. In 1955 the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals entered its decision in Reed
v. Reed which prompted his action in the nature of a bill of review to set aside the
agreed judgment on a mutual mistake of law. The trial court gave him favorable judgment
in 1956. In the appeal by the defendant to the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, opinion
was not rendered until 1958 by which time Smith v. Ricks had been decided by the
supreme court, and the court of civil appeals held that decision to be determinative of the
issue. As indicated in note 51 supra, the supreme court upheld the decision below indicating
that a mistake of law not induced by fraud or misconduct of the other party is not
grounds for relief in equity.
53 161 Tex. at 572, 342 S.W.2d at 566:
We assume for the purposes of this opinion that in view of the instructions
given to the broker by the husband in the wife's presence, the issuance and
acceptance of the stock certificates in their names as joint tenants with right
of survivorship constitutes a written agreement . ...
14327 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), noted, 14 Sw. L.J. 518 (1960).
" 258 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). Survivorship in a joint bank account was
involved; however, the co-owners were the decedent and a niece, not husband and wife.
so 143 Tex. 307, 184 S.W.2d 823 (1945); see text accompanying note 46 supra.
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agreement even though a third party, the United States Government, was involved."s Hence, Smith v. Ricks was overruled in unmistakable terms. The only alternative was to follow "the unrealistic approach" of treating an "or" bond as being "analogous
to a life insurance contract." The Texas treatment of life insurance
purchased with community funds prior to the 1957 amendment ss
to Article 23 had been the subject of extreme confusion.59 The court
stated that the Texas cases s" prior to that time had been able to
support the holding that proceeds of insurance on the life of one
spouse become the separate property of the survivor by reasoning that
the insurance contract was not property and that the proceeds paid
after death were not acquired during marriage. Therefore, in the absence of fraud it was separate property even if the policy insured the
wife's life in favor of her husband. This was the underlying rationale
of Smith v. Ricks"' which followed Edds v. Mitchell. The latter had
likened "p.o.d." bonds to a policy of life insurance in which the
beneficiary of the policy becomes the donee beneficiary to the contract between the decedent and the company."2 Since Articles 4624a
and 881a-23 specifically provide a method of partition not possible
prior to the 1948 constitutional amendment, the court indicated that
the article must be construed to exclude other methods of partition
during marriage.
The decision of the court appears to be logically correct. The
decision is in accord with the concepts of the indivisibility of the
community estate during marriage. As Justice Walker points out,
the Ricks decision "seemingly presents little difficulty provided he
[the husband] dies first.""3 If the wife dies first, the difficulty is
that the husband as manager of the community has been allowed to
buy stocks and bonds with survivorship to the joint owners and
has, therefore, been permitted in effect to make a gift of community property to his own separate estate. Thus, the Hilley
decision is more consistent with the safeguards thrown up to protect
" 342 S.W.2d at 570. The court relied upon Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust v. Parnell, 352
U.S. 29 (1956).
s Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 23 (1957). The definition of the word "property" was
amended to include life insurance policies. See Recent Casenote, 10 Sw. L.J. 326 (1956).
59 Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied,
359 U.S. 913 (1959), indicates that all of the confusion may not have been alleviated. See
Stephens & Johnson, Life Insurance in Estate Planning, 15 Sw. L.J. 570, 603 (1961).
60See, e.g., Warthan v. Haynes, 155 Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956),
noted, 10
Sw. L.J. 326 (1956), and the cases cited therein by both the majority and the dissent.
" 318 S.W.2d at 439 (approving the rulings of the court below). The court below
rested its decision on this point upon Edds v. Mitchell. Smith v. Ricks, 308 S.W.2d 941, 946
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
62 143 Tex. at 320, 184 S.W.2d at 830.
"a 3 18 S.W.2d 439, 442 (1958) (dissent).
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the property rights of the wife by our community property system."4
The dissent in Hilley argues that Section 46 of the Probate Code
provides that an agreement in writing will create a valid joint
ownership with survivorship and should be given equal weight with
Article 4610. However, the reasoning of the majority seems better
for the sake of historical legal consistency. Although it is possible
that the change in the court's personnel between Ricks and Hilley
brought about the change in the court's decision as much as any
other factor,' it appears that the decision does not result in any
actual diminution of flexibility in the management or planning of
the community estate. As indicated by a dictum in the majority
decision, there is nothing to prevent a statutory partition"6 followed
by a proceeding in which the wife obtains management of her
separate estate;6 7 husband and wife can then enter into a valid
survivorship agreement.
Nonetheless, the decision in Hilley v. Hilley stirred up considerable interest in the problem of survivorship agreements among
the members of the Texas bar, and the passage of House Bill 670
has added fuel to the speculative fire."8

B. House Bill 670
To the language of Section 46 of the Probate Code6" in force at
the time of the Hilley decision, the 57th Legislature added the
following language: "It is specifically provided that any husband
and his wife may, by written agreement, create a joint estate out
of their community property with rights of survivorship. '7 ° The
future effect, if any, of Hilley v. Hilley is dependent upon the
construction to be given this amendment, which took effect on
May 15, 1961.
Two lines of thought concerning the effect of the amendment
appear to have emerged. The first is that the amendment was de4 Speer, op. cit. supra note 35, § 150, at 203-04: "He has no right to make capricious
gifts of such property, nor such disposition of it as tends to augment his separate estate
to the detriment of the community."
65 Justices Hickman and Garwood have retired from the bench since the Smith v. Ricks
decision. Justice Greenhill apparently changed his position in the interim. Thus, only three
justices of the original majority of six in the Ricks case remained to dissent in Hilley.
66Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4624a (1949).
T
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4614(d) (1957) provides that the married woman
may qualify for sole management of her separate property upon proper filing with the
County Clerk.
6" Survivorship of Joint Tenancies in Corporation Stocks and Bank Deposits-Hilley
v. Hilley and H.B. 670, address by John Paul Jackson, Corporation, Banking, and Business
Law Section, State Bar of Texas (1961), in 24 Tex. B.J. 710 (1961).
7"'Tex. Prob. Code § 46 (1955).
0Acts 1961, ch. 120.
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signed to be an express legislative rejection7' of the Hilley decision
and in effect an affirmance of Smith v. Ricks. With the traditional
absence of citable legislative history in Texas, this view to be
sustained must be supported by the language of the statute itself.
Consequently, the proponent of this view may contend that, because
the court in the Hilley decision stated that such an agreement would
be valid only if it is sanctioned by statute, the legislature, in answer
to this, specifically authorized such agreements. Others, who argue
against the statute's validity, do not question what the legislature
attempted to do but contend that the legislation is ineffective because it is unconstitutional." Relying on the landmark case of Arnold
v. Leonard73 and the frequently cited Northern Texas Traction Co.
v. Hill," they argue that the legislature cannot create a new class
of property. The effect of the amendment is to allow separate
property to be created out of community property by agreement
between the spouses during marriage. Thus, Article 16, Section 15,
of the Texas Constitution which limits separate property to that
received by gift, devise, or descent is violated.
Another view which may be suggested is that the courts will not
find House Bill 670 unconstitutional, nor will they find that the
result in Hilley v. Hilley has been impaired. It may be assumed that
the court will first seek to avoid the constitutional question by traditional methods of statutory construction." Accordingly, it may be
presumed that the legislature would not have intended, in the
absence of a specific declaration, to have amended other statutes
pertinent to management and status of community property such
as Articles 4614,76 4619,17 462178 or 4624a,7 and, therefore, these

statutes and the new amendment must be construed together.
Applying this methodology to the first view (that the amendment overruled Hilley) it would be necessary to conclude either
that (1) House Bill 670 amended Articles 4619 and 4621 sufficiently
to give the wife power of management over her half of the com"' Wren, Recent Texas Statutes Affecting Estate Planning, 15 Sw. L.J. 479 (1961).
Jackson, supra note 68.
7'114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
71 297 S.W. 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.
7' E.g., "Courts ought not to interpret laws so as to nullify or impair them when their
language reasonably admits of a different meaning." Spears v. City of San Antonio, 110
Tex. 618, 223 S.W. 166, 169 (1920). "All laws in pari materia must be construed together." Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351, 40 S.W.2d 20, 22 (1931).
76 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4614 (1957) (wife's separate property and her power
of contract and management.)
"Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1959) (community property definition).
(wife's power to contract with com7Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4621 (1925)
munity property).
7
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4624a (1949) (partition).
71
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munity property so that she could contract with her husband for
its disposal s" without complying with the filing requirements of
Article 4614(b)," or that (2) the word "agreement" in House
Bill 670 could be read to mean "partition" 2 so as to come within
the sanction of the 1948 amendment to Article 16, Section 15, of
the Constitution and be, in effect, an amendment to Article 4624a.
The court will probably reject any reasoning which concludes that
an amendment to Section 46 of the Probate Code also amended
any of these well-established statutes governing the status of the
community. It seems to follow that if the amendment contained
in House Bill 670 is to receive a construction consistent with the
foregoing statutes it is necessary to find that it incorporated into
statute the dictum in Hilley which suggested that such an agreement is valid provided:
(1) That the parties enter into a valid partition agreement under 4624a
which transmutes the community property by halves into the
separate property of each.
(2) That the wife then qualify for management of her now separate
estate under 4614(b) and (d) which creates in her a capacity to
obligate herself contractually.

Thus the wife, armed with the capacity to enter a binding contract in regard to her separate estate, may enter into an agreement
with her husband for a valid joint tenancy and survivorship without contravening the provisions of Article 4610.
If the foregoing speculation is accepted, i.e., that House Bill 670
would be construed to be constitutional and found to have the
effect of approving the dictum in Hilley as to the manner in which
a valid survivorship agreement should be made, then it would appear
that this bill supersedes Hilley only to the extent that the decision
" The effect of these two statutes is that the wife's power to contract a community
debt is limited to necessaries unless joined by her husband or unless he has abandoned her
for more than a year.
" This article applies to the wife's separate property only and not to the community
estate. However, if the wife must make a filing with the County Clerk in order to obtain
management and contract power over her personal estate, a fortiori, she should not have
such power in the case of community property.
"See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 881a-23 (1929) and text accompanying note
31 supra. In the case of building and loan shares the legislature specifically provided the
authority for partition. In a similar statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4622 (1925),
applicable to joint bank accounts where the legislature has not provided for partition, the
courts have said: "The [statutory] presumption concerning separate property status of
bank accounts . . . does not apply where the contest is between the spouses themselves
or their successors." Hodge v. Ellis, 154 Tex. 341, 352, 277 S.W.2d 900, 907 (1955);
see Reed v. Reed, 283 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). It seems to follow that had
the legislature intended H.B. 670 to permit partition that it would have said so and
insisted upon the same formality that is contained in arts. 4624a and 881a-23 which
require the wife's separate acknowledgment to a partition agreement.

COMMENTS
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relied upon Article 4610. However, Justice Walker's opinion did
not necessarily rest upon the provisions of Article 4610, and indeed
there was no reason at all to have done so, for the definitional argument, as exemplified by the reference to Arnold v. Leonard, was
certainly sufficient to sustain the decision." And the same argument
is just as powerful after the passage of House Bill 670 as it was
before. Indeed, if House Bill 670 was intended to act solely upon
that portion of the Hilley opinion which rested upon Article 4610,
a logical explanation can be given for the placing of the amendment in Chapter II of the Probate Code which is captioned Descent
and Distribution. This argument is further bolstered by the fact
that the legislature should have amended Article 4624a if they
really desired to effect a change in the result of Hilley. Moreover,
they would have greatly increased the amendment's chances of constitutional sanction.
C. Free v. Bland
The majority opinion in Hilley brushed aside the matter of federal
regulations overriding state law. This problem was raised in Smith
v. Ricks and is now raised by Free v. Bland,84 an action by the
surviving husband against the son of the deceased wife. The husband was the designated co-owner with his wife of certain United
States Savings Bonds purchased during marriage. Treasury Department regulations make a surviving co-owner the sole and absolute
owner of the bond. The son, independent executor of his mother's
estate, was also the devisee of the bulk of her estate. The son
claimed half of the bonds, alleging that they were community
property. The court of civil appeals"' held for the husband under
the reasoning of Smith v. Ricks, and the Texas Supreme Court
reversed under the reasoning of Hilley v. Hilley. However, the
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari"8 and the case
is presently docketed before that court. It is certainly within the
realm of possibility that the Supreme Court may follow its reasoning in Wissner v. Wissner" and assert the "federal supremacy" of
government regulations concerning its bonds to justify reinstating
Smith v. Ricks insofar as survivorship resulting from co-ownership
of government bonds is concerned. However, there seems to be
little justification" for a decision based on allowing mere administra161 Tex. at 579, 342 S.W.2d at 571.
344 S.W.2d 435 (1961).
Tex. -,
85 337 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).

83
84

88
87

U.S. 82 Sup. Ct. 50 (1961).
338 U.S. 655 (1950).

88 338 U.S. at 661

(Minton, J., joined by Frankfurter and Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
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tive expediency89 to override the established property system of a
state, especially when the treasury regulation is obviously promulgated solely for that agency's convenience. Indeed, there is far
less reason for such a holding than there was in Wissner, in which
the majority of the Court could point to a strong national interest
growing out of World War II and evidenced by a plain congressional
mandate."
IV. CONCLUSION

In summary, it would appear that House Bill 670 may well be
ineffective if its purpose was to permit a husband and wife to enter
into a joint tenancy and survivorship agreement by the mere purchase
of a stock certificate. If the statute is not sustained constitutionally
by harmonizing it with the previously existing statutes and general
theory of Texas community property law (thus emasculating it
at least in part), then it will probably be struck down as unconstitutional. It further appears that it would have been desirable for
the Legislature to have amended or repealed Article 4610 directly
rather than to have chosen to amend Section 46 of the Probate Code.
Article 4610 in its present form is an anachronism and has been
extended beyond any justification, either socially or historically. 1
5

" McKnight, Book Review, 11 Sw. L.J. 272, 274 & n. 10 (1957).
9"The Wissner decision involved an action by the widow of a deceased army officer
against his mother whom he had named as principal beneficiary of his National Service
Life Insurance policy. Under California community property law the widow was successful
in the state court in establishing a claim for one half of the policy proceeds both past and
present. On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed indicating that the 1940
statute creating G.I. insurance "forestalls the existence of any 'vested' right in the proceeds
of federal insurance." 338 U.S. at 661. The court in support of its decision pointed to the
congressional policy of affording material protection and enhancing the morale of the
serviceman. 338 U.S. at 660.
" The Spanish community property system provided that the parties to a marriage
contract might contract prior to marriage with respect to the character of their matrimonial property. Fuero Juzgo, Bk. 4, Tit. 2, Law 17; Las Siete Partidas, Part. 4, Tit. 11,
Law 24. The wife might also renounce her community interest during marriage or after
the husband's death in order to avoid liability for community debts. Novisima Recopilacion,
Bk. 10, Tit. 4, Law 9. Thus the law of matrimonial property was given a certain flexibility.
The Spanish authorities are discussed in I DeFuniak, Principles of Community Property
286-391 (1943). Article 4610 enacted in 1840 was designed to give this same flexibility,
but since the law of forced heirship, Act of Jan. 28, 1840, § 13, 4 Laws of Republic 167
(Hartley 1850), was then in effect in Texas, the statute forbade marriage contracts that
would run contrary to the law of legitime. When the forced heirship statute was repealed
in 1856, Acts of 6th Leg., Spec. Sess. 5 (1856); art. 3868 Paschal's Digest 644 (1870);
art. 2534 Sayles' Laws 369 (1888), it apparently did not occur to the legislature to repeal
the reference to it in art. 4610. The words
and in no case shall they enter into an agreement, or make any renunciation,
the object of which would be to alter the legal orders of descent, either with
respect to themselves, in what concerns the inheritance of their children or
posterity, which either may have by any other person, or in respect to their
common children; . . .
have been read quite contrary to their original purpose and should be deleted from the
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Admittedly, the day is long past when a married woman needed
the guardianship of the courts otherwise extended to idiots, minors,
and seamen, but even today a wife may be content to follow unquestioningly her husband's will in business and property matters.
It does not seem unreasonable where the property rights of the heirs
of either spouse are concerned that some small solemnity should
accompany the survivorship agreement. Requiring the three-step
approach of partition, wife's qualification to manage her separate
property and a survivorship agreement would impose sufficient notice
of the effects of the action contemplated to afford some protection
to the non-initiating spouse. Such deliberation can not be achieved
by a quick call to the broker's office with instructions from one or
the other of the spouses that the certificates be issued with provision for joint tenancy and survivorship.
Hailey v. Hailey allows involuntary partition of community realty
on divorce. Hilley v. Hilley is concerned with voluntary partition
of the community estate during marriage or at death. In Hilley
and related cases the court has construed Article 4624a to limit the
means of a voluntary partition. In Hailey the court extended the
means of involuntary partition of community realty on divorce.
Although a logical inconsistency of approach may be asserted, it
appears more apparent than real. Article 4624a allows voluntary
partition of the entire community estate with judicial supervision.
Article 4638 as construed in the Hailey case allows involuntary
partition of the entire community estate by judicial action in
rendering a divorce. Neither limits the possibility of partition; both,
however, require the protection and supervision of the courts.

statute. It may also be noted that since the courts have quite unjustifiably extended the
statute to agreements made by spouses during marriage (see note 40 supra.), the legislature
ought to limit Art. 4610 to ante-nuptial contracts.

